What is up to us

The Enchiridion opens with a sorting. Some things are up to us and some are not, Epictetus says, and he gives both lists. Up to us: opinion, impulse, desire, aversion, "in a word, everything that is our own doing." Not up to us: the body, property, reputation, office, "everything that is not our own doing" (Enchiridion, 1). Everything else in Stoic ethics follows from getting the sorting right. Confuse the two and you will be hindered and will grieve. Keep them straight and nothing can compel you.

Notice what is on the short list. Not outcomes, and not even actions in the ordinary sense, since actions depend on a body that can be stopped. What is up to you is the judging: taking an impression, deciding whether it is worth wanting, and moving accordingly. That is the whole of what Epictetus thinks you own.

Now an assistant offers to handle the day. It has read more, it is calmer, it knows what you will regret. You tell it your goals once and it chooses the meals, the replies, the job to apply for. Every one of those choices is, on Epictetus's list, an opinion or an impulse or a desire. The motion says giving them away costs something that matters even if the assistant chooses better. Before you answer, ask what Epictetus would count the handover as: an exercise of your judgement, since you judged the assistant reliable, or the one thing on the list you were not supposed to give to anyone.